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 This matter requires us to decide whether elected 
officials are entitled to qualified immunity when they retaliate 
against a fellow official by denying him reappointment to a 
non-elected position because of comments he made in his 
capacity as an elected official.  Because we conclude that the 
contours of the First Amendment right at issue were not 
clearly established, we hold that Appellants are entitled to 
qualified immunity on their federal claim.1 
 
I. 
 
 In 2007, Harold Werkheiser was elected to serve on 
the three-member Board of Supervisors within Pocono 
Township.  His six-year term began in January of 2008 and 
was scheduled to expire at the end of 2013.  In addition to 
Werkheiser, the Board of Supervisors was comprised of 
Defendant Frank Hess, who was elected in 2009, and 
Defendant Henry Bengel, who was elected in 2011 (together, 
“Appellants”).  Defendant Pocono Township (the 
“Township”), is a Second Class Township within the County 
of Monroe, Pennsylvania.   
 
 Township Supervisors are permitted to hold positions 
of employment with the Township, including Roadmaster.  
The Roadmaster, or Director of Public Works, is a Township 
                                                 
1 In denying Appellants’ motion to dismiss, the District 
Court allowed both Werkheiser’s federal claim and state law 
claim to proceed.  Appellants have not appealed the District 
Court’s denial of their motion as it pertains to Werkheiser’s 
state law claim and review of that decision is not before us. 
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employee responsible for the supervision of all the activities 
of the Township Road Department and the Township Parks 
and Recreation Department.  In 2008, Werkheiser was 
appointed Roadmaster by the Board of Supervisors.   
 
 Hess began receiving wages in 2011 and, in 2012, 
assumed administrative duties previously performed by a 
predecessor supervisor.  He received approximately $36,000 
per year in salary, health insurance, and other employee 
benefits, and holds the titles of Chairman of the Board of 
Supervisors, Secretary, and Treasurer.  In 2012, Hess became 
temporarily disabled and took leave from the Township for 
ten days.  During his absence, Frank Froio was selected by a 
consultant to the Township to assume Hess’s administrative 
duties.  Froio was not appointed by the Board of Supervisors.  
On February 6, 2012, Bengel made a motion, seconded by 
Hess, to hire Froio as Township Administrator.  Froio was to 
receive compensation of approximately $70,000 annually.  
Werkheiser opposed the motion, but it nonetheless carried.   
 
 As Froio’s position developed, Hess’s responsibilities 
and workload decreased.  Hess, however, continued to collect 
approximately the same compensation.  Werkheiser voiced 
his objection to the cost of Froio’s position to the Township 
and to the creation of a new position with greater expense.  
He also objected to paying Hess when his duties were being 
performed by Froio, as well as to the appointment of an 
outside grant-writer, who would be performing work that 
Werkheiser asserted should be performed by Froio and Hess.   
 In December of 2012, Appellants decided they no 
longer wanted Werkheiser to serve as Roadmaster.  Along 
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with several others, they began private deliberations to 
discuss denying Werkheiser reappointment for 2013 and to 
instead replace him with Bengel.  In January of 2013, 
Werkheiser was formally denied reappointment as 
Roadmaster at a noticed reorganization meeting.   
 
 As a result of the decision to not reappoint him, 
Werkheiser commenced an action in Pennsylvania state court.  
Defendants removed the action to federal court, and 
Werkheiser subsequently filed an amended complaint.  In that 
complaint, Werkheiser asserted a claim for First Amendment 
retaliation, as well as a state law claim under the Second 
Class Township Code and Pennsylvania Sunshine Law.  As to 
his First Amendment retaliation claim, Werkheiser alleges 
that he was denied his position as Roadmaster as a result of 
speech he expressed in his capacity as an elected official 
concerning the Board of Supervisors’ overpayment for 
administrative duties.  
 
II. 
  
 Appellants filed a motion to dismiss both claims, 
asserting, among other things, that they were entitled to 
qualified immunity as to Werkheiser’s federal claim against 
them.  They argued that because Werkheiser’s speech 
concerning Township resources and payments were made in 
his official capacity as an elected representative of the 
Township, the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), applied.  Accordingly, they 
asserted, Werkheiser’s speech was not protected by the First 
Amendment, and he was unable to demonstrate the violation 
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of his constitutional rights.  For his part, Werkheiser disputed 
the applicability of Garcetti, arguing that speech by elected 
officials should be treated differently than speech by public 
employees, and that, as an elected official, his speech was 
entitled to First Amendment protection not granted to public 
employees.  The District Court agreed with Werkheiser, 
noting that there were important differences between the 
public employees discussed in Garcetti and elected officials.  
It therefore concluded that Werkheiser had established a 
constitutional violation.   
  
 Appellants also argued that they were entitled to 
qualified immunity because the law regarding Werkheiser’s 
rights was not clearly established.  The District Court rejected 
this argument as well.  The District Court concluded that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 
136-37 (1966), clearly established that elected officials are 
entitled to exercise their First Amendment rights free from 
retaliation.  Further explaining that the Supreme Court had 
said nothing in Garcetti that overruled or altered its opinion 
in Bond, the District Court denied Appellants’ motion to 
dismiss.  The current appeal followed. 
 
III. 
  
 The Supreme Court has established a two-step analysis 
that governs whether an official is entitled to qualified 
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immunity.  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).2  First, 
whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff show the violation of 
a constitutional right, and second, whether the right at issue 
was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.  
Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 
2010) (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201).  We may address the 
two Saucier prongs in either order, at our discretion.  Pearson 
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).  Because we do not 
believe the right at issue here was clearly established, we 
begin with the second step.   
  
 “A Government official’s conduct violates clearly 
established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, 
‘[t]he contours of [ a] right [are] sufficiently clear’ that every 
‘reasonable official would have understood that what he is 
doing violates that right.’”  Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 
2074, 2083 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 
635, 640 (1987) (all alterations in original)).  “In determining 
whether a right has been clearly established, the court must 
define the right allegedly violated at the appropriate level of 
specificity.”  Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 
2012).  The Supreme Court recently emphasized that “‘[w]e 
do not require a case directly on point’ before concluding that 
                                                 
2 The District Court began its analysis with a 
discussion of Werkheiser’s constitutional rights and, 
specifically, whether elected officials are entitled to First 
Amendment protection for their official speech.  Because we 
conclude that the law was not clearly established as to the 
existence of such a right, we need not probe the merits of the 
District Court’s analysis on this point. 
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the law is clearly established, ‘but existing precedent must 
have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond 
debate.’”  Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 5 (2013) (quoting al-
Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083). 
  
 A. It was Not Clearly Established that an   
  Elected Official’s Speech is Entitled to  
  First Amendment Protection 
  
 The District Court concluded that Appellants are not 
entitled to qualified immunity because “a reasonable official 
would have understood that retaliating against Werkheiser 
because he spoke as an elected official on issues concerning 
the Township would violate his constitutional rights.”  
Werkheiser v. Pocono Twp., 13-cv-1001, 2013 WL 4041856, 
at *14 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2013).  We disagree, and conclude 
that Werkheiser’s First Amendment rights, as an elected 
official, were not sufficiently defined as to warrant denying 
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Appellants qualified immunity.3  We pause here to emphasize 
that we do not today decide whether Garcetti is applicable to 
elected officials’ speech or not.  Rather, we conclude only 
that the law was not clearly established on this point. 
 
 In Garcetti, a non-elected deputy district attorney 
brought a section 1983 action alleging First Amendment 
retaliation against the county and his supervisors.  In his 
capacity as deputy district attorney, he had prepared a 
memorandum discussing concerns he had about potential 
government misconduct.  Allegedly motivated by the 
expressions in his memorandum, the deputy district attorney 
was then subjected to a series of retaliatory employment 
actions.  In its opinion, the Supreme Court drew a distinction 
between a “public employee,” like the attorney, and an 
ordinary citizen who speaks out for him or herself.  Garcetti, 
547 U.S. at 417.  In the case of public employees, restrictions 
                                                 
3 Although not discussed by the District Court or 
mentioned in any party’s brief before this court, Werkheiser 
suggested at oral argument that we apply the holdings of two 
First Amendment freedom of association cases, Elrod v. 
Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 
507 (1980), whereby the Supreme Court explained that an 
individual may establish a retaliation claim based on an 
adverse action taken against him or her based on political 
association.  However, these cases are inapposite here, where 
Werkheiser has not advanced any freedom of association 
claim and instead bases his claim against Appellants entirely 
on his contention that they violated his First Amendment 
freedom of speech.     
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on speech are permissible because, “when a citizen enters 
government service, the citizen must accept certain 
limitations on his or her freedom.”  Id. at 418.  Accordingly, 
the Court held that the plaintiff’s memorandum was not 
protected speech under the First Amendment.  Id. 
 
 Of course, “public employees do not surrender all their 
First Amendment rights by reason of their employment.  
Rather, the First Amendment protects a public employee’s 
right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen 
addressing matters of public concern.”  Id. at 417.  Thus, the 
Supreme Court explained, “[s]o long as employees are 
speaking as citizens about matters of public concern, they 
must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary for 
their employers to operate efficiently and effectively.”  Id. at 
419.   
 
 Conversely, the Court noted that restrictions on speech 
by public employees were less problematic than restrictions 
on speech by ordinary citizens.  This is so, in part because, 
“[e]mployers have heightened interests in controlling speech 
made by an employee in his or her professional capacity.  
Official communications have official consequences, creating 
a need for substantive consistency and clarity. ”   Id. at 422.  
Indeed, some restrictions on employee speech were deemed 
necessary because “[s]upervisors must ensure that their 
employees’ official communications are accurate, 
demonstrate sound judgment, and promote the employer’s 
mission.”  Id. at 422-23.  The court reasoned that greater 
restrictions on public employees’ speech than on ordinary 
citizens are therefore permissible because such restrictions 
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“simply reflect[ ] the exercise of employer control over what 
the employer itself has commissioned or created.”  Id. at 422. 
 
 Many of the reasons for restrictions on employee 
speech appear to apply with much less force in the context of 
elected officials.  Werkheiser’s speech as an elected official is 
not subject to prior review or approval.  To use Garcetti’s 
language, his speech is neither “controlled” nor “created” in 
the same way that an employer controls the speech of a 
typical public employee.  And, as the Supreme Court 
admonished, “[p]roper application of [its] precedents . . . 
leads to the conclusion that the First Amendment does not 
prohibit managerial discipline based on an employee’s 
expressions made pursuant to official responsibilities.”  Id. at 
424 (emphasis added).  But of course, there is no truly 
comparable analog to “managerial discipline” when 
discussing retaliation between elected officials. 
 
 And, because elected officials to a political body 
represent different constituencies, there would seem to be far 
less concern that they speak with one voice.  In fact, debate 
and diversity of opinion among elected officials are often 
touted as positives in the public sphere.  See Bond, 385 U.S. 
at 136-37 (“Legislators have an obligation to take positions 
on controversial political questions so that their constituents 
can be fully informed by them . . . also, so [constituents] may 
be represented in governmental debates by the person they 
have elected to represent them.”). 
 
 Moreover, as the District Court here highlighted, the 
notion that speech pursuant to a public employee’s “official 
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duties” is afforded no protection under the First Amendment 
could have odd results if applied to elected officials.  Relying 
on another district court opinion from this circuit, the court 
noted that “if Garcetti applied to elected officials, speaking 
on political issues would appear to be part of an elected 
official’s ‘official duties,’ and therefore unprotected.  But 
protection of such speech is the ‘manifest function’ of the 
First Amendment.”  Werkheiser, 2013 WL 4041856, at *9 
(quoting Zimmerlink v. Zapotosky, No. 10-237, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 53186 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2011)) (citing Bond, 
385 U.S. at 135).  Of course, Appellants may well have been 
exercising a competing First Amendment right to make a 
political statement by removing Werkheiser.  See Blair v. 
Bethel Sch. Dist., 608 F.3d 540, 545 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting 
that “almost all retaliatory actions can be expressive” and 
that, while an elected official may have the right to criticize 
other officials for their votes, the elected officials he is 
criticizing “had the corresponding right to replace [him] with 
someone who, in their view, represented the majority view.”). 
 
 We are also sensitive to the fact that Supreme Court 
precedent prior to Garcetti suggests that Werkheiser’s speech 
may be entitled to some degree of First Amendment 
protection.  In Bond v. Floyd, the Supreme Court held that an 
elected official’s First Amendment rights were violated when 
the Georgia House of Representatives refused to seat him 
because of statements he had made criticizing the Vietnam 
War.  385 U.S. at 135-136.  The Court noted that the 
“manifest function of the First Amendment in a representative 
government requires that legislators be given the widest 
latitude to express their views of policy” and “debate on 
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public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”  
Id.  Indeed, the Court noted that it was part of a legislator’s 
official duties “to take positions on controversial political 
questions so that their constituents can be fully informed by 
them, and be better able to assess their qualifications for 
office; also so they may be represented in governmental 
debates by the person they have elected to represent them.”  
Id. at 136-37.  The Supreme Court did not deem it necessary 
to address or revisit Bond in deciding Garcetti. 
 
 Notwithstanding then, that the underlying rationale in 
Garcetti appears, to some extent, inapplicable to elected 
officials, we take seriously the Court’s explicit 
pronouncements that the “controlling factor” in that case was 
that the expressions at issue “were made pursuant to [the 
plaintiff’s] duties as a calendar deputy” and that the 
“significant point is that the memo was written pursuant to 
[the plaintiff’s] official duties.  Restricting speech that owes 
its existence to a public employee’s professional 
responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee 
might have enjoyed as a private citizen.”  Garcetti, 547 U.S. 
at 421-22.  Indeed, the Court’s stated holding was simply that 
“when public employees make statements pursuant to their 
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for 
First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not 
insulate their communications from employer discipline.”  Id.  
While there may be sound reasons to assert that Garcetti does 
not apply to elected officials’ speech, we cannot accept the 
District Court’s inherent conclusion that it is “beyond debate” 
that this was clearly established law at the time of 
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Werkheiser’s non-appointment.  Stanton, 134 S. Ct. at 5 
(quoting al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083).4   
                                                 
4 Werkheiser argues that even if Garcetti’s “public 
employee” analysis applies to elected officials, it is not 
applicable to him because Town Supervisors are not 
employees of the town.   
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 In this regard, we note the unsettled nature of the law 
amongst both the circuit courts and the district courts.  In 
Rangra v. Brown, 566 F.3d 515, 518 (5th Cir. 2009), a Fifth 
Circuit panel grappled with whether elected officials’ speech 
                                                                                                             
Relying on two lower state court cases, he argues that 
Garcetti does not apply to township supervisors because they 
are not “employees” of the town.  However, Werkheiser 
misconstrues the law.  In those cases, the courts were merely 
attempting to determine whether town supervisors were 
employees for purposes of two specific state statutes: the state 
Workmen’s Compensation law, Savage v. Mt. Pleasant Twp. 
Supervisors, 181 A. 519, 520 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1935), and a 
particular provision of the Second Class Township Code 
authorizing premium payments, Appeal of Auditor’s Report of 
Muncy Creek Twp., 520 A.2d 1241, 1245-46 (Pa. Cmwlth. 
1987).  The state courts’ decisions did not speak to whether 
town supervisors are employees in any broader sense and, in 
the latter case, noted that the provision at issue must not have 
been intended to include supervisors because it would have 
granted them “unfettered authority . . . to approve additional 
compensation for themselves.”  Appeal of Auditor’s Report of 
Muncy Creek Twp., 520 A.2d at 1245-46.  In any event, the 
mere fact that, in certain contexts, state courts have declined 
to deem Town Supervisors employees in no way compels the 
conclusion that they are not public employees for purposes of 
First Amendment analysis.  Moreover, the question is not 
necessarily whether elected officials are public employees, 
but rather whether they are sufficiently similar to public 
employees that Garcetti governs and they are not entitled to 
First Amendment protection.   
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is entitled to First Amendment protection in the wake of 
Garcetti, albeit outside of the retaliation context.  In rejecting 
Garcetti’s application to elected officials, the court concluded 
that “when the state acts as a sovereign rather than as an 
employer, its power to limit First Amendment freedoms is 
much more attenuated.  That is because a state’s interest in 
regulating speech as a sovereign is ‘relatively subordinate . . . 
[as] [t]he government cannot restrict the speech of the public 
at large just in the name of efficiency.”  Id. at 522-23 (citing 
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994)).  In holding 
that elected officials' speech is entitled to First Amendment 
protection, the court permitted the officials to challenge 
certain provisions of the Texas Open Meetings Act that 
criminalized the discussion of public matters by a quorum of 
public officials when outside of an open meeting.  Id. at 522; 
see also Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 981 (7th Cir. 
2010) (applying strict scrutiny to certain provisions of 
Wisconsin Code of Judicial Conduct and engaging in a 
balancing test for others, but taking for granted that an elected 
state court judge’s speech is entitled to some degree of First 
Amendment protection).  
 
 The continuing viability of the panel's decision in 
Rangra is, however, somewhat in doubt.  Following 
publication of its decision, the Fifth Circuit reheard the case 
en banc, and, in a one sentence opinion devoid of any 
analysis, simply ordered the case dismissed as moot.  See 
Rangra v. Brown, 584 F.3d 206, 207 (5th Cir. 2009) (en 
banc).  Moreover, at least one circuit court has expressed 
skepticism that elected officials’ speech is entitled to any 
protection whatsoever.  See Parks v. City of Horseshoe Bend, 
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480 F.3d 837, 840 n.4 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating in a footnote 
without analysis that the elected official-plaintiff’s speech 
would not be protected under the First Amendment if it was 
made in the course of her official duties).5 
 
 There is also substantial disagreement among the 
district courts.  Compare Hogan v. Twp. of Haddon, No. 04-
2036, 2006 WL 3490353 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 2006), aff’d on other 
grounds, 278 F. App’x 98 (3d Cir. 2008) (concluding that 
defendant was entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s 
First Amendment claim because Garcetti applies to elected 
officials’ speech and speech made in plaintiff’s capacity as 
elected official was therefore not entitled to First Amendment 
protection); Hartman v. Register, No. 06-cv-33, 2007 WL 
915193 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2007) (dismissing First 
Amendment retaliation claim on substantially same grounds); 
Shields v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 617 F. Supp. 2d 606 
(W.D. Mich. 2009) (granting defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment on substantially same grounds), with 
Zimmerlink, No. 10-237, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53186, at 
                                                 
5 We note as well that we have not yet addressed 
Garcetti’s application to elected officials.  We had occasion 
to do so, but, having affirmed the district court’s decision on 
other grounds, expressly declined to reach the issue.  See 
Hogan v. Twp. of Haddon, 278 F. App’x at 102 n.1 (noting 
that although the plaintiff had “argued that the District Court 
improperly applied the Supreme Court’s precedent in Garcetti 
v. Ceballos . . . because we conclude that [plaintiff’s] First 
Amendment rights were not violated, we need not reach her 
Garcetti arguments.”).   
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*6-7, 8-11 (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss because 
“governmental interest in regulating speech of public 
employees to promote efficient operations does not apply to 
speech of an elected official”); Carson v. Vernon Twp., Civ. 
No. 09-6126, 2010 WL 2985849, at *14 (D.N.J. July 21, 
2010) (denying motion to dismiss claim of deprivation of free 
speech, at least in part, because elected official’s political 
expression on township matters was “unquestionably 
protected under the First Amendment.”). 
 
 Although the Supreme Court has noted that qualified 
immunity is not the guaranteed product of disuniform views 
of the law, we find that the well-reasoned decisions on both 
sides render the law sufficiently unclear at the time of 
Appellants’ actions so as to shield them from liability.  
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1. v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 
378 (2009).  
 
 B. It was Not Clearly Established that the Type  
  of Retaliation at Issue Here Would Violate  
  the First Amendment 
 
 In addition, we hold that the law was not clearly 
established that the kind of retaliation Appellants engaged in 
against Werkheiser violated his First Amendment rights. 
 
 Werkheiser essentially asks this court to declare that a 
politically motivated act, undertaken by a majority of his 
fellow elected Board of Supervisors, pursuant to their proper 
authority, nonetheless violates the First Amendment if it is 
taken in retaliation for speech made in his capacity as an 
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elected official.  As this court has indicated, however, not all 
retaliation violates the First Amendment.  See Thomas v. 
Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 296 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting 
that the First Amendment requires “retaliatory action 
sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from 
exercising his constitutional rights.”) (citation omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
 
 To be sure, Bond, which the District Court heavily 
relied on, signified that one kind of very serious retaliation by 
elected officials is unlawful  -- the exclusion of a duly elected 
official from office.  But we discern nothing in Bond that 
suggests the Court intended for the First Amendment to guard 
against every form of political backlash that might arise out 
of the everyday squabbles of hardball politics.  See, e.g., 
Camacho v. Brandon, 317 F.3d 153, 162 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(concluding that a city council member’s aide could not bring 
a First Amendment retaliation claim for his dismissal, in part, 
because it would “subject to litigation all manners and 
degrees of politically motivated, retaliatory conduct directed 
at public officials.”); Zilich v. Longo, 34 F.3d 359, 363 (6th 
Cir. 1994) (“The First Amendment is not an instrument 
designed to outlaw partisan voting or petty political bickering 
through the adoption of legislative resolutions.”).  Rather, as 
other courts to consider the issue have concluded, the First 
Amendment may well prohibit retaliation against elected 
officials for speech pursuant to their official duties only when 
the retaliation interferes with their ability to adequately 
perform their elected duties.  See Blair, 608 F.3d at 545 n.4 
(Ninth Circuit opinion noting that retaliation is unlawful 
when it has the “effect, deleterious to democracy, of 
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nullifying a popular vote” or otherwise “deprive[s] [an 
elected official] of authority he enjoyed by virtue of his 
popular election.”). 
 
 Our opinion in Monteiro v. City of Elizabeth, 436 F.3d 
397, 404 (3d Cir. 2006), similarly offers Werkheiser little 
assistance.  In that case, an elected member of the New Jersey 
City Council claimed that his First Amendment rights were 
violated when he was ejected from a Council meeting, 
allegedly for expressing a particular viewpoint.  The 
defendants then sought to cloak themselves in the doctrine of 
qualified immunity.  On appeal, we were asked to decide only 
whether, when entitlement to qualified immunity depends on 
a disputed issue of fact – in that case, whether the plaintiff 
had in fact been ejected for expressing a particular viewpoint 
-- it is proper to submit that question to the jury.  In affirming 
the district court’s decision to deny summary judgment and 
allow a jury to decide that question, we noted that “[i]t is 
clearly established that when a public official excludes an 
elected representative or a citizen from a public meeting, she 
must conform her conduct to the requirements of the First 
Amendment.”  Id.  But Monteiro, like Bond, focused on an 
elected representative whose ability to fulfill his elected 
obligations was purposefully impaired when he was 
prevented from speaking at a Council meeting.  Our opinion 
says nothing about elected officials’ First Amendment rights 
when the action at issue does not involve any such 
impairment. 
 
 We also note in this regard decisions from the Fifth 
and Ninth circuits.  In Blair v. Bethel Sch. Dist., the Ninth 
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Circuit addressed whether an elected official could 
successfully claim retaliation under the First Amendment for 
speech made in his capacity as an elected official.  608 F.3d 
at 541.  The plaintiff in Blair was a publicly elected member 
of the school board, who had also been elected by his peers to 
serve as vice president.  In his capacity as a member of the 
school board, Blair served as a persistent critic of the school 
district superintendent.  Eventually, Blair’s fellow board 
members voted to remove him as vice president.  Id. at 543.  
Blair then sued, alleging that the Board’s conduct constituted 
impermissible retaliation against him for exercising his First 
Amendment rights. 
 
 The Ninth Circuit held that retaliation against an 
elected official is largely not actionable when it is at the 
hands of his peers in the political arena.  Id.  The court 
emphasized that Blair, like Werkheiser here, had been 
removed from a position “by the very people who elected him 
to the position in the first place.”  Id. at 544.  Importantly, the 
Ninth Circuit noted that “despite [Blair’s] removal as Board 
vice president, he retained the full range of rights and 
prerogatives that came with having been publicly elected.”  
Id.  Absent such a deprivation, the court refused Blair’s 
invitation to more broadly conclude “that the First 
Amendment prohibits elected officials from voting against 
candidates whose speech or views they don’t embrace.  
Experience and political reality convince us this argument 
goes too far.”  Id. at 545.  Accordingly, the court concluded 
that the Board’s action did not amount to retaliation in 
violation of the First Amendment.  Id. at 546.    
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 In Rash-Aldridge v. Ramirez, 96 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 
1996), the plaintiff was an elected member of the city council 
who was later appointed to represent the council on a local 
metropolitan planning board.  In her capacity as an appointed 
member of the body, she wrote a letter taking a position at 
odds with one maintained by the city council.  As a result of 
her actions, the council removed her from her appointed 
position and she sued.  Id. at 118-119. 
 
 The plaintiff in Rash-Aldridge concededly made the 
statements for which she was removed as an appointed 
representative of the council, and not, as is alleged here, in 
her capacity as an elected representative.  However, that fact 
was immaterial to the Fifth Circuit's decision.  Rather, in 
concluding that the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights had not 
been violated, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that her removal 
from the appointed office had “no implication of [her] 
fundamental rights as an elected official.”  Id. at 119.  “Her 
capacity as an elected official was not compromised because 
the council did not try to remove her from her seat on the 
council nor take away any privileges of that office because of 
what she said or did.”  Id. 
 
 The Fifth Circuit did not address whether the 
plaintiff’s speech would be protected under the First 
Amendment.  But that is of little moment.  In Rash-Aldridge, 
as in Blair, the court drew an important distinction between 
types of retaliation against elected officials: the type of 
retaliation at issue in Bond, which impedes elected officials' 
ability to serve as effective representatives, and is, therefore, 
impermissible; and the type of retaliation at issue here, where 
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an elected official is removed from an unrelated position that 
does not interfere with his or her role as an elected official 
and that, accordingly, does not run afoul of the First 
Amendment.6 
 
 To be sure, as we indicated in our discussion on the 
applicability of Garcetti to elected officials’ speech, we do 
not now decide these constitutional issues and what 
retaliation against elected officials, if any, violates the First 
Amendment.  Rather, we consider this legal landscape to 
decide whether Appellants are entitled to qualified immunity.  
Contrary to the District Court, we conclude that these 
opinions suggest that elected officials who are retaliated 
against by their peers have limited recourse under the First 
Amendment when the actions taken against them do not 
interfere with their ability to perform their elected duties.   
                                                 
6 We are mindful that the underlying facts adduced at 
trial in Squires v. Bonser, 54 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1995), a 
case cited by Werkheiser and decided by a panel of this court 
that included the undersigned, bear a striking resemblance to 
the current action.  Nonetheless, on appeal in Squires, the 
only question before us was whether the district court’s denial 
of the former Roadmaster’s request for reinstatement as a 
remedy was inappropriate.  As a result, the analysis we 
employed in Squires offers little guidance here.  Nonetheless, 
the fact that a jury awarded a plaintiff in Werkheiser’s 
position damages on a nearly identical claim – a judgment 
seemingly at odds with the remainder of the case law on this 
issue – may suggest the unsettled nature of the law as to this 
issue as well.   
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 There is no allegation here that the failure to reappoint 
Werkheiser as Roadmaster in any way excluded him from 
Town Supervisors’ meetings, interfered with his rights, 
privileges, or responsibilities as an elected official, or 
hindered his ability to fulfill his elected duties.  Indeed, the 
complaint indicates that although he was not reappointed as 
Roadmaster in January of 2013, his term as Township 
Supervisor did not expire until the end of that year and there 
is no indication that he did not fully and ably serve until the 
completion of his term.  Thus, unlike in Bond or Monteiro, 
where an elected body attempted to prevent an official from 
carrying out the duties bestowed upon him by his 
constituents, here, the Board of Supervisors merely declined 
to offer Werkheiser a position that was wholly unrelated to 
his position as an elected official and that it had provided him 
with in the first place.  Against this legal backdrop, and under 
these circumstances, it is not beyond debate that a reasonable 
official in Appellants’ position would have understood that 
retaliating against Werkheiser by denying him reappointment 
would violate his constitutional rights.   As a result, 
Appellants are entitled to qualified immunity. 
 
IV. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the District 
Court’s order and judgment dated August 8, 2013 and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
